Survivors also related reports of individuals who listened to the message, returned to their floors, and did not make it out after the second aircraft impacted WTC 2. Some survivors related that a small number of people traveled to the roof under the assumption that a helicopter rescue was possible (Cauchon 2001b).

2.2.2.5 Initiation of Collapse
The same types of structural behaviors and failure mechanisms previously discussed are equally likely to have occurred in WTC 2, resulting in the initiation of progressive collapse, approximately 56 minutes after the aircraft impact. Review of video footage of the WTC 2 collapse suggests that it probably initiated with a partial collapse of the floor in the southeast corner of the building at approximately the 80th level. This appears to have been followed rapidly by collapse of the entire floor level along the east side, as evidenced by a line of dust blowing out of the side of the building. As this floor collapse occurred, columns along the east face of the building appear to buckle in the region of the collapsed floor, beginning at the south side and progressing to the north, causing the top of the building to rotate toward the east and south and to begin to collapse downward (Figure 2-32). It should be noted that failure of core columns in the southeast corner of the building could have preceded and triggered these events.

2.2.2.6 Progression of Collapse
As in WTC 1, a very large quantity of potential energy was stored in the building, during its construction. Once collapse initiated, much of this energy was rapidly released and converted into kinetic energy, in the form of the rapidly accelerating mass of the structure above the aircraft impact zone. The impact of this rapidly moving mass on the lower structure caused a wide range of structural failures in the floors directly at and below the aircraft impact zone, in turn causing failure of these floors. As additional floor plates failed, the mass associated with each of these floors joined that of the tower above the impact area, increasing the destructive energy on the floors immediately below. This initiated a chain of progressive failures that resulted in the total collapse of the building.
A review of aerial photographs of the site, following the collapse, as well as identification of pieces of structural steel from WTC 2, strongly suggests that while the top portion of the tower fell to the south and east, striking Liberty Street and the Bankers Trust building, the lower portion of the tower fell to the north and west, striking the Marriott Hotel (WTC 3). Again, the debris pattern spread laterally as far as approximately 400-500 feet from the base of the structure.


2.2.3 Substructure
As first WTC 2, then WTC 1 collapsed, nearly 600,000 tons of debris fell onto the Plaza level, punching large holes through the Plaza and the six levels of substructure below, and partially filling the substructure with debris. This damage severely compromised the ability of the slabs to provide lateral bracing of the substructure walls against the induced lateral earth pressures from the unexcavated side. This condition was most severe at the southern side of the substructure, adjacent to WTC 2 and WTC 3. In this region, debris from the collapsed WTC 2 punched through several levels of substructure slab, but did not completely fill the void left behind, leaving the south wall of the substructure in an unbraced condition over a portion of its length.
In early October, large cracks were observed along Liberty Street, indicating that the south wall had started to move into the failed area under the influence of the lateral earth pressures. Mueser-Rutledge Engineers were retained to review the situation and make suitable recommendations. As a temporary measure, sand fill was backfilled against the inside face of the south wall to counterbalance earth pressures on the unexcavated side. Following temporary stabilization of the wall, tiebacks were reinstalled through the wall in a manner similar to that used to stabilize the excavation during the original construction of the development. After these tiebacks were installed, it was possible to begin excavation of the temporary sand backfill and the accumulated debris. Tiebacks were similarly installed at the other exterior substructure walls to provide lateral support as the damaged slabs and debris were excavated and removed from the site.


2.3 Observations and Findings
The structural damage sustained by each of the two buildings as a result of the terrorist attacks was massive. The fact that the structures were able to sustain this level of damage and remain standing for an extended period of time is remarkable and is the reason that most building occupants were able to evacuate safely. Events of this type, resulting in such substantial damage, are generally not considered in building design, and the ability of these structures to successfully withstand such damage is noteworthy.
Preliminary analyses of the damaged structures, together with the fact the structures remained standing for an extended period of time, suggest that, absent other severe loading events such as a windstorm or earthquake, the buildings could have remained standing in their damaged states until subjected to some significant additional load. However, the structures were subjected to a second, simultaneous severe loading event in the form of the fires caused by the aircraft impacts.

Figure 2-32 The top portion of WTC 2 falls to the east, then south, as viewed from the northeast.

The large quantity of jet fuel carried by each aircraft ignited upon impact into each building. A significant portion of this fuel was consumed immediately in the ensuing fireballs. The remaining fuel is believed either to have flowed down through the buildings or to have burned off within a few minutes of the aircraft impact. The heat produced by this burning jet fuel does not by itself appear to have been sufficient to initiate the structural collapses. However, as the burning jet fuel spread across several floors of the buildings, it ignited much of the buildings' contents, causing simultaneous fires across several floors of both buildings. The heat output from these fires is estimated to have been comparable to the power produced by a large commercial power generating station. Over a period of many minutes, this heat induced additional stresses into the damaged structural frames while simultaneously softening and weakening these frames. This additional loading and the resulting damage were sufficient to induce the collapse of both structures.
Because the aircraft impacts into the two buildings are not believed to have been sufficient to cause collapse without the ensuing fires, the obvious question is whether the fires alone, without the damage from the aircraft impact, would have been sufficient to cause such a collapse. The capabilities of the fire protection systems make it extremely unlikely that such fires would develop without some unusual triggering event like the aircraft impact. For all other cases, the fire protection for the tower buildings provided in-depth protection. The first line of defense was the automatic sprinkler protection. The sprinkler system was intended to respond quickly and automatically to extinguish or confine a fire. The second line of defense consisted of the manual (FDNY/Port Authority Fire Brigade) firefighting capabilities, which were supported by the building standpipe system, emergency fire department use elevators, smoke control system, and other features. Manual suppression by FDNY was the principal fire protection mechanism that controlled a large fire that occurred in the buildings in 1975. Finally, the last line of defense was the structural fire resistance. The fire resistance capabilities would not be called upon unless both the automatic and manual suppression systems just described failed. In the incident of September 11, not only did the aircraft impacts disable the first two lines of defense, they also are believed to have dislodged fireproofing and imposed major additional stresses on the structural system.
Had some other event disabled both the automatic and manual suppression capabilities and a fire of major proportions occurred while the structural framing system and its fireproofing remained intact, the third line of defense, structural fireproofing, would have become critical. The thickness and quality of the fireproofing materials would have been key factors in the rate and extent of temperature rise in the floor trusses and other structural members. In the preparation of this report, there has not been sufficient analysis to predict the temperature and resulting change in strength of the individual structural members in order to approximate the overall response of the structure. Given the redundancy in the framing system and the capability of that system to redistribute load from a weakened member to other parts of the structural system, it is impossible, without extensive modeling and other analysis, to make a credible prediction of how the buildings would have responded to an extremely severe fire in a situation where there was no prior structural damage. Such simulations were not performed within the scope of this study, but should be performed in the future.
Buildings are designed to withstand loading events that are deemed credible hazards and to protect the public safety in the event such credible hazards are experienced. Buildings are not designed to withstand any event that could ever conceivably occur, and any building can collapse if subjected to a sufficiently extreme loading event. Communities adopt building codes to help building designers and regulators determine those loading events that should be considered as credible hazards in the design process. These building codes are developed by the design and regulatory communities themselves, through a voluntary committee consensus process.
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